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NORWAY’S COMPANIES ACT: A 




This analysis assesses the amendment to Norway’s Com-
panies Act, in light of the 10-year anniversary of the mandate 
of female representation on corporate boards.  First, I discuss 
the implementation of the quota, Section 6-11a.  Second, I com-
pare three statistical studies that analyze the effects of the 
quota on corporate profitability, overall firm performance, and 
the changing dynamics of the managerial positions.  Finally, I 
evaluate the various avenues to fully achieving diversity, such 
as the successes and failures of a quota-type system and possi-
ble initiatives that governments and companies can enact to 
achieve gender-balance in the workplace.  While some hypothe-
size that the quota negatively affects overall firm capability 
and value, the statistical data on the effects of the legislation is 
not dispositive. Ultimately, it is in the best interest of corpora-
tions to learn from Norway’s example in implementing manda-
tory female representation, and to explore other avenues to 
achieving diversity. 
 
I. BACKGROUND ON NORWAY’S COMPANIES ACT 
“Power is not something that is given, it is something that 
you have to take.” 1  A Danish economist, Benja Stig-Fagerland, 
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said this in regards to securing female leaders in Norway dur-
ing the time the quota was enacted, which mandated female 
representation on Norway’s corporate boards.2 In 1999, the 
quota was first recommended as an amendment to the Equal 
Status Act of 1978.3  Just before the final vote on the issue, 
Ansgar Gabrielsen, the Minister of Trade and Industry, ex-
pressed that he was “sick and tired of the male dominance of 
business life.”4  These unequivocal viewpoints sparked the fire 
needed for the quota to pass into law, and set the precedent for 
gender-equality in the corporate world of Norway. 
Section 6-11(a) defines the quota, which mandates both 
men and women to be represented on corporate boards5 in all 
public limited companies in the private sector.6  The represen-
tation breakdown is as follows: 
(1) In the boards of publically listed…companies, both 
genders should be represented, as follows: 
1. Where there are two or three board members, 
both genders should be represented. 
2. Where there are four or five board members, both 
genders should be represented with at least two 
members each. 
3. Where there are six to eight board members, both 
genders should be represented with at least three 
members each. 
4. Where there are nine or more members of the 
board, each gender should be represented with at 
least 40 percent each. 
5. Rules 1 to 4 also apply to the election of deputy 
members.7 
                                                                                                                                     
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
01/28/world/europe/28iht-quota.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
2 Id. 
3 Knut Nygaard, Forced Board Changes: Evidence from Norway 22 (Nor-
wegian Sch. Of Econ., Discussion Paper, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793227. 
4 AAGOTH STORVIK & MARI TEIGEN, FREIDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG, WOMEN 
ON BOARD: THE NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE 7 (2010), available at 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07309.pdf. 




70 PACE INT’L L. REV. SYMPOSIUM ED. [Vol.  26::1 
In 2003, the Norwegian Parliament approved this amend-
ment to Norway’s Companies Act.8 Beginning in 2006, the quo-
ta has been applied to all “newly established public limited 
companies.”9  Originally, the Norwegian Parliament preferred 
the adoption of the quota to be voluntary.10  However, in 2006, 
a mandatory quota was instituted because firms failed to raise 
their female representation in compliance with the suggestive 
quota.11  In 2008, all public limited companies were required to 
instate this quota.12 
To facilitate this change, the Norwegian government creat-
ed a database of female candidates for corporations to evaluate 
the qualifications of potential women leaders.13  Furthermore, 
the penalties for non-compliance work to assist as another 
foundational driving force behind the accomplishment of the 
quotas: “non-compliance with the sanctions, mean the closing 
down of companies who fail to comply.”14  Additionally, compa-
ny board registration is prohibited if the requirements of repre-
sentation are not met.15 
II. EFFECTS OF SECTION 6-11A 
A. Kenneth R. Ahern and Amy K. Dittmar Study 
In order to reasonably ascertain the effects of the Norway’s 
Companies Act on corporate firms, it is necessary to simply 
look at the numbers.  First, take Kenneth R. Ahern and Amy 
K. Dittmar’s study, which concentrated on the effects of the 
quota on board characteristics, profitability, and overall firm 
value.16  Their study was composed of a sample size of 1,230 
                                                            
8 Id. at 3. 
9 Id. at 5. 
10 SUSAN VINNICOMBE ET AL., WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF 
DIRECTORS: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 82 (2008). 
11 David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in Corporate Lead-
ership? Evidence from Quotas 6 (Inst. for the Stud. of Lab. (IZA), Discussion 
Paper, 2012). 
12 STORVIK & TEIGEN, supra note 4, at 4. 
13 Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: 
The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 
127 Q. J. ECON. 137, 145 (2011). 
14 VINNICOMBE ET AL, supra note 8, at 83. 
15 Storvik & Teigen, supra note 4, at 9. 
16 See Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 13. 
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firm-year observations, covering 248 Norwegian firms.17 
In regards to their financial status, a firm’s value was 
computed mainly using Tobin’s Q.18  Q is “the sum of the total 
assets and market equity less common book equity divided by 
total assets.”19  Financially, the leverage of the firms stayed 
constant during the study, but the short-term debt rose over 
time.20 Tobin’s Q ranged from 1.11 to 1.88, with a mean of 
1.53.21 
Board sizes have remained moderately constant over the 
years, signifying that corporations replaced individuals on the 
board to observe the quota, rather than adding members to 
achieve the same result.22  However, there is negative data that 
correlates to the quota’s effect on firm policies.23  The theory is 
that if the management board lacks experience in comparison 
to a board, which is not mandated by a quota, then the firm’s 
overall value decreases.24  Firms increased their financial risk 
as a result of the quota, due to the increase in debt level and 
leverage.25  Efficiency decreased as there were less experienced 
board members handling top-level positions.26 
Ahern and Dittmar came to several general conclusions as 
a result of these statistics: 
By the end of the 2000s, the average board has less CEO experi-
ence, fewer insiders, and more non-executive managers.  The 
gender differences in these characteristics and the coincidence of 
timing between these changes and the implementation of the 
quota suggest that the quota dramatically changed not only the 
gender but also other characteristics of the board.27 
Overall, the data is consistent with the concept of the quo-
tas putting a restriction on the freedom of corporations to 
choose new members based purely on qualifications.  This sig-
nifies that before, the quota boards were chosen to maximize 
                                                            
17 Id. at 149. 
18 Id. at 148. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 154. 
21 Id. at 154. 
22 Id. at 153. 
23 Id. at 159-60. 
24 Id. at 179. 
25 Id. at 180-81. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 154-55. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/7
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wealth, and after, the constraints due to gender representation 
negatively impacted their value. 
B. Knut Nygaard Study 
Compare the above study with one conducted by Knut Ny-
gaard of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Ad-
ministration.  Nygaard’s criticisms of Ahern and Dittmar’s 
study included a failure to “condition their analysis on firm 
specific information asymmetry,” as well as a sample size 
which over-emphasized new firms.28  Nygaard’s sample size in-
volved a survey of all Norwegian listed firms, done on behalf of 
the Daily Oslo Stock Exchange (OSO) by the auditing firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in 2005.29 
The survey measured the value and availability of public 
information, rather than a firm’s compliance with the legisla-
tion.  Additionally, Nygaard specifically addressed Ahern and 
Dittmar’s study in his findings.  Nygaard takes the position 
that their sampling bias, excluding year 2007, creates an em-
phasis on new firms, which could account for the reduced mar-
ket value based on Tobin’s Q.30  Furthermore, Ahern and 
Dittmar’s study has less than one third of the firms that are in-
cluded in Nygaard’s statistical analysis.31  Nygaard seriously 
questions Ahern and Dittmar’s results due to their sampling 
procedures, and argues several competing conclusions. 
First, Nygaard asserts that the firms, which had subpar 
board construction prior to the quota, benefitted from the in-
creased monitoring from women on the board.  Second, a surge 
of female board members correlates to an increase in outside 
directors.  “With less information asymmetry, it is easier for an 
outside or female director to transform her general expertise to 
a specific firm and become an effective director.”32  Most im-
portantly, Nygaard concluded that a negative impact from the 
legislation is generally inconsequential at “standard levels of 
statistical significance.”33 
                                                            
28 Nygaard, supra note 3, at 3. 
29 Id. at 10. 
30 Id. at 18. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 19. 
33 Id. 
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C. David A. Matsa and Amalia R. Miller Study 
David A. Matsa and Amalia R. Miller also conducted a 
study  regarding the effect of the mandate on corporate prof-
its.34  They compared firms in Norway before and after the 
mandate using data from Bureau Van Dyjk’s Orbis database.35  
The sample size was limited to firms “with shares listed on an 
exchange and with nonmissing information on directors, indus-
try, assets, employees, labor costs, and operating profits in 
2006,” totaling 104 companies.36  
An index was created from a certain selection of firms in 
Norway:  “[f]or each public company in Norway, we identify the 
five closest firms in each of the three comparison groups based 
on industry, assets, employees, and operating profits in 2006.”37  
Overall, there were 1,560 observations corresponding to 1,103 
different firms.38  As a result, female representation increased 
from 1.1 to 2.3, and male members decreased from 5.0 to 4.1.39  
In comparison to Ahern and Dittmar’s study, which showed no 
change in board size, this study found that board size increased 
marginally from 6.1 to 6.3 members.40  
Additionally, in contrast41 to Ahern’s study, the quota’s ef-
fect on corporate profit was not statistically significant.42  
Matsa and Miller concluded that there was a short-term profit 
decline.43  More importantly, it shed light on other aspects of 
the mandatory representation.  For example: employment rose, 
there were sizable differences in managerial styles between the 
two sexes, and there is evidence that “female corporate leaders 
exhibit similar values and preferences outside of Norway as 
well.”44  
In comparatively assessing these studies, there are definite 
transformations of corporate boards in Norway due to the 
                                                            
34 Matsa & Miller, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
35 Id. at 7. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 8. 
38 Id. at 9. 
39 Id.at 8. 
40 Id. at 9. 
41 Id. at 27. 
42 Id. at 30. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 34. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/7
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mandate of female representation.  A common hypothesis that 
Ahern and Dittmar, as well as Matsa and Miller share, is that 
changes in profitability could be a result of the dysfunctional 
transition period of the legislation.45 They both found that the 
quota had affected corporate policies.46  The Matsa and Miller 
study contrastingly found that there was no decline in average 
director experience following the quota, making inexperience of 
new female members ineffectual on the firm’s overall perfor-
mance following the legislation.47 
 III. GENERAL TRENDS AND THEORIES BEHIND FEMALE 
REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS 
 There are many contending theories as to which envi-
ronmental factors are associated with increased female roles in 
corporations, and what affects this diversity has on perfor-
mance.   For example, according to Terjesen and Singh, histori-
cal political elements are disassociated with an increase in fe-
male directorships.48  These authors present two competing 
theories as to why female political representation correlates 
negatively with female representation on corporate boards.  
First, women make a conscious choice to chase jobs in politics 
over business, in those countries where political power has 
been developing.49  Second, countries with high representation 
of women in politics have become complacent.50 
Anne Sweigart gives credence to the first, rather than se-
cond, theory.  She reasons that the complacency theory is un-
likely to be applicable to the Norwegian quota, because count-
less women’s groups supported the amendment.51  The first 
theory is more plausible because women have pursued careers 
in politics for the logical reason that prior to the quota, they 
saw more room for progression in that field as opposed to the 
                                                            
45 Id. at 26. 
46 Id. at 33. 
47 Id. at 25. 
48 Siri Terjesen & Val Singh, Female Presence on Corporate Boards: A 
Multi-Country Study of Environmental Context, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 55, 61 
(2008). 
49 Id. at 57-58. 
50 Id. at 61. 
51 Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for Change: The Norway Model of 
Boardroom Quotas as a Tool for Progress in the United States and Canada, 
32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 81, 86 (2012). 
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corporate world.52 
The economic development of a certain country is not dis-
positive of a country’s decision to mandate a gender-equality 
quota in the workplace.  There are examples of nations with 
low development levels and increased female representation, 
and also countries with higher development levels that have 
lower numbers of women in high-level positions.53  Although 
economic development has virtually no impact on female repre-
sentation, research has shown that diversity on corporate 
boards has improved decision-making and monitoring func-
tions.54   
First, since women and men have different capabilities and 
potentials, diversity allows for the demonstration of a wider 
range of skills.55  Second, because men and women have differ-
ent “life experiences,” their inclusion gives corporate boards a 
wider range of solutions to business and management issues.56  
Finally, the simple awareness of diversity on a board tends to 
positively alter team dynamics.57 Additionally, there is evi-
dence that diversity “can enhance a firm’s reputation with con-
sumers.”58 
Amidst these competing theories, a few solid correlations 
can be determined.  First, female representation correlates 
negatively with political representation, while the economic 
status of a country seems to have no effect on gender-equality.  
Second, there is evidence that such diversity does in fact have 
an effect on overall workmanship and collaboration.  Finally, 
some authorities hold that there is a positive effect in incorpo-
rating female characteristics into boards.   
 
                                                            
52 Id. 
53 Rohini Pande and Deanna Ford, Gender Quotas and Female Leader-
ship: A Review 5 (Harv. Univ., Discussion Paper, Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rpande/papers/Gender%20Quotas%20-
%20April%202011.pdf. 
54 See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate 
Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? (Rock Ctr. for Corp. 
Governance at Stan. Univ., Working Paper No. 89, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1685615. 
55 Id. at 10. 
56 Id. at 11. 
57 Id. at 13-14. 
58 Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/7
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IV. EVALUATION OF AVENUES TO FULLY ACHIEVE DIVERSITY IN 
THE WORKPLACE 
The Norwegian quota is certainly groundbreaking legisla-
tion, working to achieve diversity on a massive scale.  However, 
there are many critics of this avenue for achieving gender bal-
ance, while also enhancing corporate performance.  Many feel 
that instituting a quota produces a less-qualified managerial 
board.59  As a result, foreign investors might opt out of compa-
nies they feel would be less profitable as a result of inexperi-
enced leaders.60   
However, Reiersen and Sjafjell dismiss this argument as 
meritless61  “Meeting the requirements of Section 6-11a should 
[therefore] not be difficult, although investors that are used to 
looking to ‘boys’ clubs’ only for directors will have to take off 
their blinkers.”62  Furthermore, the Act does not entirely re-
strict a corporation’s freedom in selecting directors. 
Despite criticisms in regards to a less-qualified managerial 
board, many preventative measures can be taken if a country 
decides to implement such a quota.  For example, corporations 
can institute programs to ensure that female employees pos-
sess comparable skills to male directors.  A successful quota re-
quires a cooperative environment, and since men have had this 
experience from already fulfilling such positions, they would 
only benefit from conducting workshops and seminars to share 
their knowledge with their upcoming female peers. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the statistical da-
ta present here is not indicative of a mandate applied in other 
countries.  A rising number of governments are instituting a 
similar quota, which will eliminate the inherent shock that 
Norway experienced with this cutting-edge legislation.63  Arni 
Hole, the director general of the Equality Ministry stated that 
when the quota was first announced: “There were, literally, 
                                                            
59 STORVIK & TEIGEN, supra note 4, at 6. 
60 Id. at 7. 
61 Beate Sjafjell & Hedvig Bugge Reiersen, Report from Norway: Gender 
Equality in the Board Room 7 (European Co. Law, Working Paper No. 8, 
2008). 
62  Id. 
	  
63 See Clark, supra note 1.  
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screams…it was a real shock treatment.”64  
Spain and the Netherlands have announced legislation 
similar to Norway.65  Other countries such as France, Belgium, 
Germany, and Sweden are also considering a mandate.66  These 
countries can not only learn from Norway’s example, but also 
improve their own processes of instituting such altering legisla-
tion.  “Any negative effect that Section 6-11a may have should 
be confined to these early days before investors are acquainted 
with the rule.”67  This logic with foreign investors applies to the 
entirety of the corporations who choose to learn from Norway’s 
example.  The adjustment period should grow shorter as more 
countries follow the Norwegian example. 
Another way to achieve diversity on corporate boards 
would be to compel companies to release information on reten-
tion, recruitment, and the promotion of women, in order to cre-
ate transparency of large companies.68  Forcible disclosure 
would provide an incentive for corporations to be more con-
scious of the inclusion of women, and prevent possible discrim-
ination in the workplace.  The government could also get in-
volved in this endeavor by mandating that companies “disclose 
whether women and minority candidates were considered or 
interviewed for open positions.”69   
The Norwegian government’s example in the Act shows 
how influential legislation can be in regulating gender balance.  
Despite what avenue they decide to take, corporations can ex-
pand their horizons and come up with different search tech-
niques for gaining qualified candidates.  For example, corpora-
tions can utilize professional consultants to search for eligible 
individuals to fill the firm’s needs.  Furthermore, companies do 
not have to limit themselves to CEOs, but can consider other 
positions, such as corporate executives, academic experts, and 
nonprofit executives.70  With a changing dynamic on corporate 
boards, firms need to adjust and develop different processes for 
finding and hiring capable and skilled workers. 
                                                            
64 Id. 
65Rhode & Packel, supra note 54, at 21.  
66 Id. 
67 Reiersen & Sjafjell, supra note 62, at 7. 
68 Rhode & Packel, supra note 54, at 20.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 22. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/7
78 PACE INT’L L. REV. SYMPOSIUM ED. [Vol.  26::1 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the example Norway set with Sec-
tion 6-11a is groundbreaking, shocking, and will set a prece-
dent for female representation on corporate boards and in the 
workplace in general.  European Union Justice Commissioner, 
Viviane Reding, stated at the beginning of this proposition: 
“Today we are proposing a legislation to smash the glass ceiling 
that keeps talented women out of top jobs.”71  However, this 
change involved a dramatic procedural difference that included 
specifically singling out women and throwing them into the 
corporate abyss.  “Ironically, achieving gender balance relies on 
labeling gender.”72 
The different studies on the statistic consequences of Sec-
tion 6-11a yield different results due to sampling size and pro-
cedural methods.  There is not much merit to the proposition 
that Norwegian corporations are suffering economically due to 
the mandate. The statistical studies, when taken together, do 
not necessarily speak to the quota’s negativity in regards to its 
effect on the corporations. It is my position that nations can on-
ly learn from Norway’s implementation process; and there are 
many different initiatives available to strengthen the female 
candidate pool to ensure prosperity.  Furthermore, quotas are 
not the end of the possibilities for securing female representa-
tion in corporations, and more generally, in the workplace.  
With innovation, like Norway’s law, on the rise, there is no lim-




                                                            
71 Reding Pushes 40% Female Quota on Corporate Boards, EURACTIV 
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/commission-gives-
green-light-gen-news-516048. 
72 Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based 
Equality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2886 (2008).  
11
